de gaulle造句
1 People hurrahed to de Gaulle for 20 minutes.
2 On 8 January 1959 De Gaulle was inaugurated as First President of the Republic.
3 De Gaulle felt that America had undue influence in Europe.
4 De Gaulle came to power in 1958.
5 De Gaulle conducted his strategy with consummate skill .
6 In his memoirs,[www.] De Gaulle wrote that he had come to London determined to save the French nation.
7 Gen. de Gaulle sensed that nuclear weapons would fundamentally change the nature of international relations.
8 De Gaulle was a born pedagogue who used the public platform and the television screen to great effect.
9 In 1961, President De Gaulle vetoed Britain's entry into the Common Market.
10 De Gaulle took a hard line towards the strike.
11 De Gaulle was swept back to power.
12 De Gaulle, however, did not lose his composure.
13 De Gaulle had already had arguments with the other five over his 1961 blueprint for political union.
14 De Gaulle was perceived and perceived himself as the incarnation of both revolution and restoration.
15 The parties accused de Gaulle of preparing a plebiscite; the General accused them of coveting an irresponsible, omnipotent assembly.
16 The discretionary power that de Gaulle gave his prime ministers varied over the course of his presidency.
17 You could see De Gaulle fervently hoped it wouldn't be broached again.
18 De Gaulle warned of a return to the bad old days of incoherence and irresponsibility.
19 In the end, de Gaulle overcame his depression by breaking the impasse.
20 On 30 May de Gaulle landed at an airstrip at Boufarik outside Algiers.
21 From that moment on, a split between de Gaulle and the parties was probably inevitable.
22 And for de Gaulle each state should have the sole right to decide what its vital interests might be.
23 But de Gaulle held firm because he knew that time was working in his favour.
24 This was the culmination of an atomic programme that the Fourth Republic had begun and which de Gaulle had accelerated.
25 So, in the summer of 1959, without abandoning association, de Gaulle decided to force the pace of his policy.
26 But it would be a distortion to suggest that de Gaulle and his agents were solely responsible for the eventual unification.
27 The key was to act at the moment when conditions were most conducive to the course upon which de Gaulle had decided.
28 It is hard to tell exactly how heavily domestic political motives weighed with de Gaulle.
29 As that fact sank in, more and more people thought of de Gaulle as a potential last resort.
30 Nobody inside the movement was permitted to acquire enough power or a high enough profile to challenge de Gaulle successfully.
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