〖ABSTRACT〗Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese scholars have often tended to split apart and then to rearrange traditional Chinese learning according to the systematics of the modern Western academic disciplines. Through an examination of the meaning of Western disciplines of "philosophy" and "ethics", the author demonstrates that we should not be quick to lump both Western and Chinese learning into the same systematics. Moreover, ancient Chinese learning has always had its own systematics, one which is extremely complex and which has endured within a long tradition and undergone continual improvement over time. For this reason, Chinese learning is well beyond any criticism which may be leveled at it from the point of view of the systematics of the West. Even so, modern Chinese intellectuals have become accustomed to understanding ancient Chinese learning through the prism of Western learning.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese scholars have often tended to split apart and then to rearrange traditional Chinese learning according to the systematics of the modern Western academic disciplines. My purpose in this essay is to examine this tendency from a new point of view. The paper takes for its case the modern history of Chinese scholarship rather than what is happening elsewhere in the world. It does neither aim at disclosing the problem of conventional academic disciplinary boundaries of Western learning, [2] nor merely insist on the importance of Chinese ancient learning and its own inner logic independent of that of Western learning. The main points of the paper are as follows:
First, while it is true that in some areas Chinese learning and Western learning contain similar subject matter, modern Chinese scholars are often unaware of essential differences between Chinese learning and Western learning in regard to their respective inner logics. This has resulted in a great historic error, that of conferring the various titles of Western academic disciplines upon certain parts of ancient Chinese learning. To subsume it under western disciplines often means that the inner logic of Chinese learning is obscured and its independent existence is exploited.
Second, ancient Chinese learning has always had its own systematics (see Section IV. below), one which is extremely complex and which has endured within a long tradition and undergone continual improvement over time. For this reason, Chinese learning is well beyond any criticism which may be leveled at it from the point of view of the systematics of the West. Even so, modern Chinese intellectuals have become accustomed to understanding ancient Chinese learning through the prism of Western learning. One of the sad consequences of this tendency is that the identity of Chinese learning has been ruined almost beyond recognition.
I. INTRODUCTION
To my mind, one of the oddest features of the Chinese academy in the twentieth century is the process of cutting apart and rearranging the ancient Chinese systems of learning according to the academic disciplines of Western systematics. In the "Introduction to A History of Chinese Ethics," published in 1910, the author, Cai Yuanpei, stated that this practice was initiated by the Japanese scholars, Kimura and Kubotoku, who were the first to attempt to "rearrange ancient Chinese theories of morals with the principles of Western ethics," and that it was on the basis of their efforts that he wrote his work on the history of Chinese ethics. [3] Later, this process was continued by professor Hu Shi whose book titled, An Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy (1918), was based on his teachings at Beijing University. [4] Then Professor Fung Yu-lan"s famous work, A History of Chinese Philosophy (Vol.1), was published in 1930 and became extremely influential in China the moment it was published. [5]
At most Chinese Universities during this time Western models were being used to establish both academic departments and teaching and research sections. The ancient Chinese systems of learning were thus divided up into a series of new sections upon which were imposed titles such as "philosophy," "ethics," "economics," "politics," "sociology," etc., all according to the systematics of the West. Since then, a movement characterized by this rearrangement of ancient Chinese learning has arisen in modern China, and it has still not run its course even today. This has resulted in a series of books entitled, A History of Chinese Philosophy, A History of Chinese Ethics, A History of Chinese Politics, A History of Chinese Economics, A History of Chinese Historical Science, etc. In this way, nearly every branch of learning in the modern Western humanities and social sciences found some kind of "corresponding discipline" within the ancient Chinese systems of learning, the only difference between the two, in the modern Chinese academic view, appearing to be that these corresponding disciplines happened not to be as mature in China as they had become in the West.
Not surprisingly, however, the contents of these "corresponding disciplines" differed considerably.
A typical view among modern Chinese scholars is thus that the biggest problem with the ancient Chinese systems of learning is that Chinese learning falls far behind Western learning. This is thought to have occurred because each of the separate academic disciplines outlined above is, in the ancient Chinese systems of learning, confusedly mixed up with all the others. That is, no strict borders or distinctions among all these different (Western) disciplines are evident in traditional Chinese learning. For example, the three most important Confucian classics of li (known as "the Three-Li": Zhou Li, Yi Li, and Li Ji) discuss not only politics, but also ethics and law. The Chunqiu Jing is a work of history, but it is often believed by modern Chinese scholars to be more important as politics than as history. The Zhou Yi (often written in English as Chou I) can be seen as a work of philosophy, but unfortunately (on the modern view), the cosmological, epistemological and methodological thoughts in this work are so intertwined that they can not be clearly distinguished from one another at all.
Many modern Chinese scholars thus lament the fact that while every problem in Confucian thinking was seen as an ethical issue, in the West many of these same problems were separated out into issues across many different disciplines. According to these scholars, Confucianism, ignorant of the distinction between philosophy and politics, and of that between the science of history and the science of law, etc., conflates ethical problems with purely political ones. The opinions of these modern Chinese scholars thus became the dominant view of the Chinese academy, and at their insistence the ancient Chinese systems of learning were accordingly rearranged and re-classified according to the modern, but entirely foreign, standards of these Western theoretical disciplines.
This view can most typically be found in Cai Yuanpei"s opinions about ethics and philosophy. In 1910, he said, "High importance has always been attached to ethics," but "there has never been a true ethics" in China, let alone a history of Chinese ethics. [6] He said this because he believed that it would be impossible to write a history of Chinese ethics without first understanding the principles of Western philosophy and the sciences, and that this would be so even if the author had read a large number of Eastern theoretical doctrines. [7] In 1918, he also wrote an introduction to Hu Shi"s work, An Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy, in which he stated:
Ancient Chinese learning has never been compiled systematically in records. Today we can not compile them systematically by means of the Chinese ancients except by means of the criteria of the history of Western philosophy. Therefore, it is impossible for anyone to achieve success in this work without studying the history of Western philosophy. [8]
I look forward to the continuation of Mr. Hu"s efforts, so that a complete outline of the history of Chinese philosophy can be compiled, putting into order the Chinese philosophies which had been both messy and rotten, both numerous and jumbled for three thousand years, providing us ready access to the study of the history of our national philosophy. It would be a great pleasure for us if he could do so. [9]
Cai"s opinions have been so influential that even today Chinese intellectuals have never attempted to go beyond the framework of these notions. This is so even among those scholars who have written specialized histories of certain ancient Chinese academic disciplines. I will now examine whether or not these ideas are appropriate.
II. Philosophy
In 1930, Fung Yu-lan wrote in the "Introduction" to his A History of Chinese Philosophy (Vol.1): "Philosophy is originally a Western concept. Now while I want to discuss the history of Chinese philosophy, what I will do is to choose from the various ancient Chinese theories of learning and describe the corresponding parts which could be called philosophy in the Western sense." [10] Fung Yu-lan continues by pointing out that for as long as several thousand years Western philosophy has generally been concerned with three substantial divisions: the theory of world, the theory of life and the theory of knowledge: [11]
"If we examine the problems studied by what, in China, during the Wei (A.D. 220-265) and Chin (265-420) dynasties, was called the "learning of the mystery" (hsuan hsüeh); by what during the Sung (A.D. 960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) dynasties was called the "learning of the truth" (tao hsüeh); and by what during the Ch"ing dynasty (1644-1912) was called the "learning of the principles" (i li chih hsüeh), we find that these problems resemble to a considerable degree those of western philosophy." [12] "It is for these reasons that I will subsequently make use of phrases such as Chinese philosophy and Chinese philosopher.
" [13]
Although it was very widely praised in Chinese academic circles after its publication, A History of Chinese Philosophy still met with serious criticism from Jin Yueling, who at that time was a professor at National Tsinghua University and also one of the most prominent philosophers in modern China. He had studied Western philosophy for about nine years in England and in other Western countries, and his attainments in Western philosophy remain among the most outstanding in China. Jing Yueling was asked to write a "review" for this work in which he introduced a discussion of the "preconditions" for composing "a history of Chinese philosophy," namely, whether or not a so-called "Chinese philosophy" and "a history of Chinese philosophy" were plausible. Interestingly, his response was as follows: Suppose one were to write a book called, A History of English Physics. What should be discussed in such a book would concern the history of physics occurring in England, but it could not concern "English" physics, for, to be precise, there is no such a thing as English physics. [14] That is, physics is a universal physics, and when physics is discussed, by anyone regardless of nationality, it must be identical to physics as a universal subject, both in substance and in form.
However, this is not the case concerning philosophy. Is there a universal philosophy beyond "Chinese philosophy" and "Western philosophy"? If there is a universal philosophy, or if we take European philosophy to be the universal philosophy, as many people (including Fung Yu-lan and Hu Shi) do, must "Chinese philosophy" be identical with this so-called "universal philosophy," both in substance and in form in the same way that "English physics" must be identical to universal physics? Unfortunately, the so-called "Chinese philosophy" described by Hu Shi and Fung Yu-lan in their books is substantially different from Western philosophy with respect to the intrinsic logic of approach, even though they occasionally contain similar subject matters.
The fact that both ancient Chinese learning and Western philosophy happen to concern views of life, of the universe and of knowledge does not in any way suggest that they are substantially the same kind of learning. Both Hu Shi and Fung Yu-lan have taken Western philosophy to be the unique universal philosophy. But if a so-called Chinese philosophy does exist, shouldn"t the relationship between Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy be similar to the relation between English physics and physics? Jing Yueling says:
Originating from the same source, the philosophical problems arising in all European countries appear to have no discrepancy. Our present tendency is to take European philosophy as the universal philosophy. Thus we may determine to what extent problems discussed by Chinese thinkers in the pre-Qin period are philosophical problems, and if so, how purely philosophical they are. This is the precondition for writing a history of Chinese philosophy. However, whether this fact is taken as important depends on the opinions of the person writing the history of philosophy. If he pays attention to the substance of philosophy, then this fact is very important for him; if he pays attention to the form of the philosophy, then this fact is not important for him. If he pays all his attention to the form, then all human problems could be philosophical problems, and the problems of Chinese thinkers in the pre-Qin period could also be philosophical problems. [15]
In matters concerning philosophy, both its substance and its form, and both its problem and its method, are involved. If one sort of thought involves both philosophical substance and philosophical form, then of course it is philosophy. If one sort of thought doesn"t involve both philosophical substance and philosophical form, then it is very problematic to say it is philosophy. If it involves only philosophical substance without philosophical form, or if it involves only philosophical form without philosophical substance, it is a great difficulty for a writer of the history of philosophy. So-called phrase "Chinese philosophy" implies within itself a difficulty of this kind. [16]
But perhaps we should propose another possibility. That is, instead of taking Western philosophy as the universal philosophy, we should simply take philosophy as a view of the world, of life or of method (like Fung Yu-lan[17] ), or understand it as "engaging in the study of the urgent problems of life, discussing it from the ultimate points of view, and looking for a final solution " (like Hu Shi). [18] Making use of these criteria we can determine whether a theory (whether Eastern or Western) conforms to philosophy, or whether it is something different from philosophy. Would it be correct to proceed in this way? I think it would not.
First of all, it is a serious error to design any man-made academic discipline without considering historical occurrences. Any time we discuss this or that academic discipline,
we can only do so on the basis of its own historical occurrence, not simply on the basis of our personal decision to write a history of this or that discipline. That is, it is only when this or that academic discipline has already occurred as an historical fact that we can compile a history of it. Secondly, while some Chinese scholars (such as Hu Shi and Fung Yu-lan) did try (artificially) to design a new academic discipline such as "the history of Chinese philosophy" and to assemble new criteria for the discipline called "philosophy," they nevertheless continued, at the same time, to accept Western philosophy as the true, the one and only, universal philosophy. Here they fell into a paradox and for the following reasons:
a. Modern Chinese thinkers had had no personal knowledge of the kind of academic discipline which was meant by the term "philosophy" before coming into contact with and studying Western philosophy;
b. No Chinese intellectuals (known as "scholars") during the past 2,500 years had ever understood what kind of academic discipline was meant by the term "philosophy," and had never considered their own systems of learning to be philosophy;
c. It was only after confronting Western philosophy that the idea of writing a history of Chinese philosophy first arose in their minds.
In fact, there is much clear evidence that both Hu Shi and Fung Yu-lan, the most prominent initiators of writing the history of Chinese philosophy, took Western philosophy to be the one and only universal philosophy. They define philosophy as a branch of learning which concerns a view of the world, of life or of method. That is, any theory which discusses the world, life or method can be seen as philosophy. According to this definition, it would seem possible to apply the label of "philosophy" to nearly any human learning (including all kinds of religious doctrines). There is no doubt that philosophy always discusses something about world, life or method, but it is certainly doubtful whether every human learning or doctrine which discusses these things should be called philosophy. Of course, it would also be absolutely problematic to simply limit the concerns of philosophy to a view of the world, of life or of method.
To be sure, the study of ancient Chinese learning from a philosophical or any other scientific point of view might be quite plausible and even significant. But a clear distinction must be made between, on the one hand, taking Confucianism and the other ancient Chinese forms of learning directly as universal philosophy, and, on the other hand, accepting that there may be a Confucian philosophy, a Taoist philosophy, and so forth. In fact, a Confucian philosophy or a Taoist philosophy may well be hidden beneath existing doctrines, just waiting for our discovery whenever we take the time to re-interpret existing Confucian or Taoist doctrines.
III. ETHICS
For a very long time now, modern Chinese scholars have been comforted by the thought that even if hardly any other academic discipline in China was as well developed as those in the West, at least the case for ethics was different. To be more precise, the Chinese have generally believed that the most developed discipline in China was ethics. However, if by the phrase "ethics" we mean what Western scholars mean by "ethics" or "moral philosophy," then I do not think the statement that "ethics is the most developed discipline in China" is a correct judgment. I think this because no discipline such as what the West means by ethics or ethical thought has ever emerged in the history of Chinese thought.
What do I mean by this? Ethics, as it arose in ancient Greece, required a specific way of thinking which is completely different from the ancient Chinese study of morals and human relationships. In the minds of many modern Chinese scholars, ancient Chinese learning (particularly Confucian learning) qualifies under the rubric of ethics because it is concerned with the same issues as Western ethics, that is, both take good and evil and human relationships as their subject matter, despite the differences in their approach to thinking.
However, this view confuses ethics (or moral philosophy) with religious doctrine and neglects the difference between a moral philosopher and a moralist. Good and evil and human relationships are issues of concern not only of ethics and the moral philosopher, but also of religion and the moralist. Concerning this issue, an American scholar, A. I. Melden has remarked:
It would be a mistake, however, to identify the moralist with the moral philosopher. Unlike the physician, whose diagnoses are assumed to be based upon a knowledge of the medical sciences, the moralist need have no competence in the corresponding theory of morals. To be sure, he may be a Plato, an Epictetus or a Kant whose moral counsel and practical concern to promote the good are supported by a more or less systematic body of theory; but he may also be a poet or prophet whose moral counsel is the fruit of long experience,
and of that practical moral sensibility to which we give the name "wisdom." Rare is the moral philosopher who does not offer moral counsel, but not at all rare is the moral counselor or the moralist for whom moral philosophy is an unexplored, unknown territory.
What, then, is moral philosophy, the theory of morals or ethics, or, to follow one current usage, ethics? It is, to begin with, a field of inquiry, the subject of a theoretical discipline. Interest in it may and normally does spring from our practical concern with good conduct, the desire to live well and reasonably. Nevertheless, the theoretical interest in the subject matter of ethics, whatever the conditions of its origin may be, must not be confused with the practical interest of moral beings. The theoretical interest is concerned with knowing; the practical interest is concerned with doing. Let us bear in mind the importance of the formation of habits in the development of moral character and conduct, and thus avoid the mistake of supposing that a knowledge of moral theory is sufficient for the improvement of our moral practice. Further, it would be dangerous, in advance of a systematic study of the subject, to argue that moral philosophy will improve our soundness in moral judgment. [19]
A. I. Melden states that if a physician faces a life and death situation with a patient under his care, he may be faced with rejecting either the moral principle requiring him to tell the truth or the moral principle requiring him to save the life of his patient. "We would probably agree that the physician ought to tell his patient an encouraging untruth." "The lie, we would say is a "white lie."" [20] However,
If we ask the moralist for a reason for his moral judgment, a variety of answers, all familiar to common sense, may be forthcoming. He may, as an ecclesiastic, refer us to the expressed will of God as revealed in sacred writings or as delivered by ecclesiastical authority. He may, as a professed humanitarian, cite the welfare of humanity which the recommended action promotes. He may refer to the authority of conscience, to simple and not further explicable moral insight, to the authority or the approval of society, to the conditions of evolutionary development or progress, the promotion of the good, the general happiness, the functions and responsibilities of physicians, the happiness of the patient, the self-interest of the agent, and so on. [21]
Although a moralist can always give a series of reasons for his moral judgement, it is not always the case that he can provide one or more ultimate reasons for his moral judgement. Moreover, the reasons he provides may be so different from one another that we would find it hard to say which of them was more reasonable or more acceptable than the others. It is the attempt to understand the true objective of the moralist which marks the beginning of a moral philosophy. This fact, I think, demonstrates that it would be a serious error to categorize this or that doctrine (or system of learning) as ethics or moral philosophy simply because it takes good and evil and human relationships for its subject matter. Both religious theory and moral philosophy discuss good, evil and human relationships. Although there is no discrepancy between religion and ethics concerning the subject matter we are concerned with, this does not suggest that we can confuse the practice of religion with ethics or moral philosophy, or that religious theory is the same as ethics. A discipline which concerns itself with good and evil or human relationships may constitute ethics, but it can also be a religious doctrine, or indeed something else entirely.
It is thus a departure from the essence of ethics as an academic discipline to refer to any learning as ethics merely because it happens to be related to issues of good and evil and human relations. Confusing ancient Chinese learning with ethics simply because it has the same subject matter is such a departure. Yes, of course, in ancient China, the study of human relationships and good and evil was extensively developed during a very long period of time, but this does not imply that in the history of China there ever emerged anything which could be called ethics or moral philosophy. The fact is that ethics, as an academic discipline which was initiated and has been discussed by Westerners for over 2,000 years, never did emerge in the history of Chinese scholarship. The reason is very simple. Nearly all ancient Chinese thinkers were true moralists with strong practical interests in "doing," rather than moral philosophers with an interest in "theoretical knowing." To express this more exactly, the actions of the ancient Chinese thinkers and their ways of thinking are more characteristic of those of Western priests and popes, and their doctrines of learning are more like Western religious doctrines.
Although in ethics one may say that the theoretical interest in knowing may be beneficial to the practical concerns of religion,
the function of moral philosophy is still quite limited. As was correctly pointed out by Aristotle, good conduct occurs in connection with moral virtue which can, in most cases, only be brought about by means of habituation and discipline. Just as knowing the correct meaning of "brave" may not necessarily bring a soldier to act bravely in war, for the same reason, a right analysis of what is good may not necessarily bring about good conduct. These concerns require the agent to pay primary attention to carrying out concrete personal actions in the most appropriate self-restrained and self-disciplined way in order to arrive at a good state of character. This is what generally happens in religious activities and is also what happened in the case of the ancient Chinese academia, especially as concerns Confucian learning. Religious thinking often appeals to intuitive, emotional and soulful understanding, rather than to accuracy and strictness of reasoning or to a search for the ultimate theoretical basis for good conduct. And it is the former that often constitutes the case of ancient Chinese learning. For religion, the discussion of moral issues serves a common end, that is, "how to do." For ancient Chinese learning, especially Confucian learning, the discussion of morals often serves practical ends such as how to cultivate one"s moral character, how to be a superior man, how to regulate a state, etc.
Generally speaking, the interest of Chinese ancient learning, especially of Confucian learning is completely practical, and the cognitive interest in what the accurate meaning of the good is and how to define social justice or the common good cannot be found in most of ancient Chinese books about morality. In other words, these are two different kinds of inner logic. The logic of Chinese learning of morals is characterized by doing, and that of Western ethics by knowing. I never believe the Western intellectual tradition, especially that of ethical studies, to be completely circumscribed by so-called "knowing" in the cognitive sense. For, even though my criterion for distinguishing the inner logic of Chinese learning from that of Western ethics is what I have described as the dichotomy of knowing and doing, it would be foolish to claim that the thought of every Western ethical thinker must be characterized by this type of knowing. I do, however, claim that the way of thinking characterized by its focus on cognitive knowing is the main thrust of the Western intellectual tradition, and this fact is immeasurably significant for those of us who are attempting to understand the distinction between Chinese learning and Western learning.
My conclusion is that ancient Chinese learning, which is concerned with good and evil and human relationships, does not in any way suggest the existence of "an ancient Chinese ethics" for the ancient Chinese learning of morals and that of Western ethics follow two almost completely different tracks. Without understanding the inner logic of Western ethics and its difference from that of ancient Chinese moral learning, it seems to me wrong to write a book about the history of Chinese ethics. My suggestion is that Cai Yuanpei"s idea that "ethics is highly developed in China" and his book entitled, A History of Chinese Ethics, is probably a consequence of his misunderstanding of both the Western term, ethics, and of the purpose of ancient Chinese scholarship.
IV. THAT CHINESE LEARNING HAS ITS OWN SYSTEMATICS
Another important reason that causes modern Chinese scholars to attempt the reorganization of Chinese traditional learning is that they believe that Chinese learning is somehow broken and lacking in its own "scientific" systematics. In particular, they believe that ancient Chinese learning fails because it was never divided into the three independent Western disciplines of literature, history and philosophy. According to Cai Yuanpei, ancient Chinese learning was "both messy and rotten, both numerous and jumbled for three thousand years." [22]
In my opinion, however, Cai Yuanpei has made a grave error. According to the records of the ancient Chinese historiographer, Shi Maqiang (145 or 135 B.C.E.), Confucius always made use of the six basic subjects of learning with his students. These were the "six arts," that is, the Shi (History), the Shu (Poetry), the Li (Rituals), the Yi (Changes), the Yue (Music), and the Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn Annals) with their corresponding classical texts. In his later years, Confucius had acquired some 72 students, all well-trained in the practice of these "six arts." This division of the ancient Chinese doctrines into six subject areas did not, of course, originate with Confucius but had already come into existence long before his day. His role was simply to put these materials into proper order, making certain deletions and adding a number of notes. Thus, even by the time of Confucius, ancient Chinese learning had already formed its own original systematics,
namely Shi, Shu, Li, Yi, Yue and Chunqiu (also known as the "five jing" after the classical text known as Yue was later lost).
This division proved adequate until the period of the Warring States (475-221 B.C.E.) when the rise of various new schools of thought and their supporters made the previous systematics insufficient to comprise all existing learning. For this reason, Liu Xing (?—23 C.E.), a historiographer in the Han dynasty, divided all learning into a different six parts, of which the "six arts" is only one part, as follows: "six arts," "the doctrines of the various schools," "literature," "military arts," "the shu-shu," (technology) and "the fang-ji"( techniques and skills). After Liu Xing, another scholar named Xun Xu (?-289 C.E.) of the Jing dynasty developed a new systematics called "The Four Departments of Jing (classics), Shi (history), Zi (the doctrines of various persons), and Ji (the collection of special topics)." Jing included the "six arts" and many other important Confucian classics. The so-called Zi included the doctrines of the various schools, and Ji was a special collection of books, each of which contained a special topic or purpose. [23]
In the largest ancient Chinese book collection, Si Ku Quan Shu (A Complete Collection of Books in the Four Departments of Jing, Shi, Zi and Ji), compiled during the Qing dynasty, the systematics of the Four Departments was normatively used and each of these departments contained several dozen additional branches of learning. Although the catalogue of Si Ku Quan Shu is a kind of catalogue raisonne, even so, a typical systematics is also clearly apparent, but in this case one consisting entirely of ancient Chinese learning. In fact, the organization of these traditional books can only be understood as having been established on the basis of a systematics of learning, that is, of Chinese academic disciplines. For example, there are catalogues such as those on "geography," "official positions," "political books," in the Shi Department; and on "military arts," "agriculture," "medical arts," "astronomical and mathematical texts," "the arts," "the art of fiction," etc. in the Zi Department. [24] I contend that it is thus a grievous error to claim that ancient Chinese learning was ever broken and non-systematic, or that it lacks its own sound systematics.
Next, is it true that ancient Chinese learning is in no way scientific or is this view fundamentally problematic? In other words, should we have thrown out the systematics of The Four Departments of Jing, Shi, Zi, and Ji and re-arranged ancient Chinese learning according to the Western systematics of literature, history, philosophy, politics, economics, law, sociology, education, etc.? As an example, the Shi Jing (the Classic Book of Poetry), the Shu Jing (the Classic Book of History), the Three-li (the Zhou Li, Yi Li, and Li Ji), the Yi Jing (I Ching), and the Chunqiu Jing are the five central books in the Jing Department. But just because the systematics of the Western humanities and social sciences would place the Shi Jing within the discipline of literature, the Shu Jing in the discipline of politics, the books of the Three-li into the disciplines of politics or ethics, the Yi Jing (I Ching) into the discipline of philosophy, and the Chunqiu Jing into the discipline of history or historiography, is that any reason for us to do the same?
Moreover, considering the fact that the catalogues of books about "politics," "history," "geography," "agriculture," "medicine," "astronomy" and "mathematics" in Shi Ku Quan Shu are quite similar to the Western systematics of politics, history, geography, economics, medicine, astronomy and mathematics, would we be justified in concluding that the ancient Chinese systematics is not entirely alien to the Western systematics, and that perhaps the only difference is that the former is not as developed and systematic as the latter? Unfortunately, such a view of the ancient Chinese systematics is substantially problematic because it neglects, to a large degree, the ancient learning"s own intrinsic reasonableness, especially that of Confucian learning.
First, the idea of Confucian learning takes the "six arts" (that is, the "five jing" plus Yue) as a complete, unified and self-sufficient body, and the Confucians strongly object to any suggestion that this unity be broken up. Shi Maqiang"s words that Confucius "had trained 72 students who were excellent in the practice of the "six arts"" implies that Confucius himself took the subjects of the "six arts" as inter-complementary and not in any way as independent and unrelated subjects. In Lun Yu, there are several records that Confucius asked his son or disciples to learn not only Shi (the Poetry) but also Li (the Rituals), Yue (the Music), etc. [25] From the time that the emperor Hanwudi (156-87 B.C.E.) established the title of "Doctors of the Five Jing," until the Tang dynasty when the Confucian writer, Kong Yingda (574-648 C.
E.), wrote his famous work, A Commentary on the Five Jing, and right up to the Ming and Qing dynasties when the Four Books and Five Jing were designated official textbooks for the screening of government officials, Chinese Confucians always accepted the "six arts," as a unified body of knowledge. For in their minds the six parts of the "six arts" were profoundly inter-related and could never be separated from one another. If we break up the unity of the "six arts" by arbitrarily subsuming the parts under the labels of various modern disciplines, then this inter-relationship, always of the utmost importance in the history of ancient Confucian learning, simply becomes unrecognizable.
Secondly, since each of the functions of the "six arts" existed independently of the others, divisions, which came about historically but were nevertheless reasonable, were formed among them. With respect to function, the "six arts" may have been independent of each other, but with respect to utility, the ‘six arts" existed as a unified body at the core of Confucian learning. This fact has been most clearly expressed in the "Tian Xian" of Zhuang Zi and the "Jing Jie" of Li Ji (In the following excerpts, the names of the "six arts" are translated as "The Poems" or "the Book of Poetry;" "The Writings of Old" or "the Book of History;" "The Rites" or "the Book of Rites and Ceremonies;" "The Music" or "the Book of Music;" "The Changes" or " the Yi," and "The Annals" or Khun Khiu,")
The Poems are useful for guiding our moods, The Writings of Old for guiding our affairs, The Rites for guiding our behavior, The Music for leading us to harmony, The Changes for teaching us about Yin and Yang, The Annals for guiding us in the matter of designations and duties. [26]
Confucius said, "When you enter any state you can know what subjects (its people) have been taught. If they show themselves men who are mild and gentle, sincere and good, they have been taught from the Book of Poetry, if they have a wide comprehension (of things), and know what is remote and old, they have been taught from the Book of History. If they be large-hearted and generous, bland and honest, they have been taught from the Book of Music. If they be pure and still, refined and subtile, they have been taught from the Yi. If they be courteous and modest, grave and respectful, they have been taught from the Book of Rites and Ceremonies. If they suitably adapt their language to the things which they speak, they have been taught form the Khun Khiu." [27]
Third, and finally, in the history of Confucian learning, the "six arts" always stood for the fundamentals of learning and were even seen as the origin of all human learning. For example, in the well-known collection of Confucian classics, the Shishan Jing, which includes thirteen of the most important Confucian classics, each classic book other than the "five jing" was seen as an analysis or an elucidation of the other "six arts," each from the point of view of one of the others. For example, Zhuo Zhuang, Gong Yang Zhuang, and Gu Liang Zhuang were written for the special purpose of elucidating Chunqiu Jing. The Zhou Li, Yi Li, and Li Ji (so-called Three-Li) are special books which elucidate the Li. The Lun Yu as a collection of the words of Confucius and his students, the Mencius as a collection of the words of Mencius and Xiao Jing (the book of Filial Piety) are all discussions or analyses of the meaning of the "six arts." Er Ya is a special book explicating the meanings of various characters in the textbooks of the "six arts." Chinese Confucians believe that the various schools of thought during the Warring States Period (475-221 B.C.E.) can all been seen as developments of the "six arts."
Either way, the "six arts" were not only originally a unified body which should never have been separated, but also the central part of all Chinese ancient learning. Liu Xing, a historiographer of the Han dynasty, placed the "six arts" in the first position in his systematics of learning because he believed them to be of primary importance concerning learning. Moreover, the systematics of The Four Departments of Jing, Shi, Zi, and Ji implies the same thing: first, Jing, meaning in Chinese "the center," "the eternal," "the irreplaceable" and "permanently valuable" is placed at the center of all human learning. Second, in the Chinese history of Confucian thought over a period of several thousand years, the "six arts" were always taken as the central and most important part of the "Jing Department." It is perhaps for the same reason that Ma Yifu, a modern Chinese Confucian, insisted that "Chinese learning is essentially the learning of six arts," and "the six arts could be a guide to all learning." [28] He argued that, not only should all doctrines in the Jing Department itself be understood through the "six arts," but also all other learning doctrines in the Four Departments should be understood through the "six arts." [29]
I believe that in the minds of the ancient Chinese,
all human experiences in Chinese civilization were to be understood through these same "six arts." For example, ancient Chinese historiography can be seen to derive from the spirit of the Chunqiu Jing, ancient Chinese political thought can be seen as a development from the Shu Jing, while ancient Chinese art and literature can be seen as the consequence of the Shi Jing and the Yue Jing. If I am correct about this, it should now be clear that it is absolutely wrong for the ancient systematics to have been broken up. These Four Departments, with the "six arts" at the center of all Chinese learning, should never have been squeezed into the Western systematics. This treatment of ancient Chinese learning has been a great distraction from the true spirit of Confucian learning.
Now we need to take a look at why (and whether it is reasonable that) there are no clear borderlines among literature, history, philosophy, politics, economics, and many other disciplines in ancient Chinese learning while they are so clear in the Western systematics of learning. My conclusion is that it is because ancient Chinese learning focuses on doing in a practical sense that there developed a systematics of the "six arts" and the Four Departments of Jing, Shi, Zi, and Ji. I thus believe that the systematics of ancient Chinese learning is no less reasonable than that of the West and should never have been attacked for failing to construct sharp borders among its disciplines.
Why is this so?
First, as soon as we recognize that Chinese learning takes "doing" as its primary concern rather than "knowing," it is clear that in order to cultivate a good personality through the practice of Chinese learning, it will no longer be necessary to treat literature, history, law and philosophical ideas separately without any consideration of their possible practical connections with one another. For if any one of these disciplines had existed independently within ancient Chinese learning, very likely it would have been because it was in some way useful in the practice of self-restraint and inner improvement.
Second, in order to become a good and noble human being, with an opportunity of being appointed to the government and, like those ancient Confucian sages and noble men, of making a great contribution to the welfare of the people and the development of the country, both moral discipline and the study of li as the rules of personal behavior (which are often directly related to the social-political system) are necessary. Just as it is impossible to cultivate one"s moral consciousness without appealing to the rules of one"s behavior in a certain socio-political context, it would be foolish to think a politician or a government official who lacked moral responsibility would be able to play his role well.
Third, according to the Confucian ideal of human life, in order to become a noble human being or a sage it would be a bad choice to separate one"s view of life either from one"s view of the world or from a possible methodology which would guide one"s way toward success. As we saw, these three, "life," "world" and "method" are, by contrast, often regarded in Western philosophy as three independent concerns.
Finally, while the ancient Chinese systematics of learning and the Western systematics of learning are both equally reasonable, it was clearly a great mistake for our predecessors to condemn the ancient Chinese systematics of learning when they had at that point only examined it through the prism of Western categories and mistakenly re-arranged its contents according to these Western standards.
END NOTES
[1] I am most grateful to Mr. David R. Schiller for having done the heavy editing work for this paper. Since it is the first time I have completed so long and so definitive a paper for publication, it took many months for him to read the whole of this paper again and again carefully, and much energy was consumed in making revisions of the paper. His work in editing the paper has gone far beyond polishing the English expression but includes many other sides. I am aslo deeply grateful to Professor Peimin Ni (Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Grand Valley State University), Professor Beth J. Singer (Professor Emerita, Department of Philosophy, Brooklyn College of The City University of New York) for having contributed quite a lot to the completion of this paper.
[2] For example, as Alasdair MacIntyre did in his fascinating book, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (University of Notre Dame Press, Second Edition, 1984).
[3] Cai Yuanpei. Zhong Guo Lun Li Xue Shi (A History of Chinese Ethics, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1987), see: "Introduction."
[4] Hu Shi. Zhong Guo Zhe Xue Shi Da Gang (An Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy, Beijing: Dong Fang Press, 1996), see: "Introduction."
[5] Fung Yu-lan. Zhong Guo Zhe Xue Shi (A History of Chinese Philosophy, Beijing: The Chinese Press, 1961), Volume 1 (of two volumes),
see: "Introduction by author." This work has been translated into English by Derk Bodde, cf. Fung Yu-lan, Ph.D., A History of Chinese Philosophy (Peiping: Henri Vetch, 1937). As we will see later, some sentences I cited from "Chapter 1: Introduction" of this work in Chinese version couldn"t been found in the corresponding part of the English version translated by Derk Bodde.
[6] Cai Yuanpei. Zhong Guo Lun Li Xue Shi, see: "Introduction."
[7] Ibid.
[8] Hu Shi. Zhong Guo Zhe Xue Shi Da Gang, see: "Introduction."
[9] Ibid.
[10] Fung Yu-lan. Zhong Guo Zhe Xue Shi, Volume 1, p. 1. This sentence is not found in the English version by Derk Bodde.
[11] Ibid., p. 2. This sentence is also not found in Derk Bodde"s translation.
[12] Fung Yu-lan, Ph.D. A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde, p. 1.
[13] Fung Yu-lan. Zhong Guo Zhe Xue Shi, Volume 1, p. 8. This sentence is not found in English version.
[14] Jin Yueling, "A Reflection on This Work," in Fung Yu-lan, Zhong Guo Zhe Xue Shi, Volume 2. This Review by Prof. Jin does not exist in the English version translated by Derk Bodde.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Cf. Fung Yu-lan. Zhong Guo Zhe Xue Shi, Volume 1, p. 2.
[18] Hu Shi. Zhong Guo Zhe Xue Shi Da Gang, p. 1.
[19] A. I. Melden., ed., Ethical Theories, a book of readings ( Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), pp. 2-3.
[20] Ibid. p. 4.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Hu Shi, An Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy, "Introduction."
[23] Cf. Zhang Tai-yan. Guo Xue Jiang Yan Lu(Speeches in Chinese Learning, Shanghai: East China University Press, 1995), pp. 45-47. Also cf. Ma Yifu. Mo Yuan Bu Shuo Sheng Ru Lei (The Silence as Loud as a Thunder, Beijing: China Broadcasting and Television Press, 1995), p. 13.
[24] Si Ku Quan Shu Zong Mu (The General Contents in A Complete Collection of Books in Four Departments of Jing, Shi, Zi and Ji, Beijing: The Chinese Press, 1965), Vol. 1 (of two volumes).
[25] Cf. Lun Yu: 8.8, 16.13.
[26] Chapter 33: The "Isms" of Our World in The Sayings of Chuang Chou, a new translation by James R. Ware (New York: The New American Library, 1963), p.224.
[27] Sacred Books of China: the Texts of Confucianism, Part IV: The Li Ki, XI-XLVI, translated by James Legge (At the Clarendon Press, 1885), Book xxxiii. King Kieh, p.255.
[28] Ma Yifu, Mo Yuan Bu Shuo Sheng Ru Lei, p. 13.
[29] Ibid.
