“旋转门”是美国政治中的一个显著特征，这一机制有助于观念和专业知识在政府和非政府组织之间顺畅交流。在美国智库，研究人员经常“旋转”出去担任政府公职，同时前政府官员也“旋转”进来接受研究职务。尽管“旋转门”这一说法对中国来说相对较新，但这一做法事实上并不陌生。中国的“旋转门”此前基本是单向运作，即党的退休高级官员进入智库，但相反的流动罕有发生。不过，中国国家主席习近平近期的表态和举措暗示，真正的“旋转门”将在不久的将来成为中国智库的重要支柱。
过去两年多来，习近平多次强调有必要壮大和发展中国智库。2016年4月，他在一次讲话中表示，他愿意将智库视为招揽党的领导干部的新来源。表示要 “把优秀人才凝聚到研究部门中来”，并“打破体制界限”，让人才能够在政府、企业、智库间实现有序顺畅流动。他明确表示：“国外那种’旋转门’制度的优点，我们也可以借鉴。”
在过去10多年中，众多中国共产党的退休领导人加入了著名中国研究机构和智库。中央党校前常务副校长郑必坚出任中国改革开放论坛理事长，这是北京一所聚焦国内和国际事务的智库。前国务委员唐家璇出任中国国际关系学会会长，此后又担任中国国际经济交流中心顾问。前外交部长李肇星则同时担任南京大学周恩来政府学院，以及位于北京的外交学院和国际关系学院院长。前国务院副总理曾培炎在2008年退休后担任中国国际经济交流中心理事长。前国务委员戴秉国在 2012年退休后也出任暨南大学校董会董事长，并担任北京大学国际战略研究院名誉院长。上述只是退休的党领导人转型进入智库继续发挥影响力的部分例子。
不过，从智库到政府的反向流动却相当罕见。长期以来，要成为党的高级领导必须要有实打实的省级和地方领导经验。但习近平主席开始打破常规，在挑选核心团队成员时开始看重智库经验。值得注意的是，两位他最重视的助手就是从政府智库开启政治生涯的，如今他们即将出任党内顶层职务。政治局委员、中央政策研究室主任王沪宁（他也曾是江泽民和胡锦涛的顾问）在进入政策研究室平步青云之前是一名学者。中央财经领导小组办公室主任刘鹤在出任现职务之前，曾在国家信 息中心和国务院发展研究中心工作。王沪宁有可能在十九大升任中央政治局常委，而刘鹤是副总理候选人并将成为中央政治局委员。值得注意的是，王刘二人进入习的核心团队靠的是他们作为思想家和顾问的能力，两人从未担任过地方或省级领导职务。这些案例显示，习近平已经为智库学者跻身党的顶层领导打开大门。
习近平还放宽了在海外接受教育的海归们加入领导层的大门。2016年8月中共中央办公厅呼吁招揽欧美同学会成员入党。目前，海归人员充斥中国研究机 构和智库，尤其是在经济学和外交学领域。例如，自2005年以来，北京大学中国经济研究中心的全部24名学者都曾在海外留学。其他智库，例如中国经济50人论坛和中国金融40人论坛中海归的比例也相当高。由于海归成为智库生力军，因此习近平强调招募这些人员的表态有可能发展成机制化体制，通过智库将这些学 者引入党的领导阶层。
习的核心团队构成显示他相信海归人员具有在党的领导层脱颖而出的能力。习近平的大学室友陈希1990年代初曾在斯坦福大学担任访问学者，目前是中组部常务副部长，主管习近平的人事任命。证监会副主席方星海在斯坦福大学获博士学位，目前在制定中国金融改革方案中扮演重要角色。上文提到的王沪宁和刘鹤也都曾在海外生活和学习。王在1988到1989年曾是爱荷华大学和加州大学伯克利分校访问学者，刘鹤曾在哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院获得MPA硕士学位。
这些并非是孤例。在党的高级领导层中海归人员的比例存在明显上升趋势。在2012年的十八届中央委员会中海归人员占比达14.6%，比2007年十 七届中央委员会高4个百分点，比2002年十六届中央委会高8.2个百分点。尽管他们的总数依然较少，但随着党进一步向海归敞开怀抱，可以预见智库将成为招贤纳士的重要渠道，由此或将出现一大批以政策为导向、具有前瞻思维的领导人。换言之，智库将在海归人员和党之间搭建一座桥梁。
河南省委书记谢伏瞻的升迁轨迹显示，这一现象已经发生。谢1991年到1992年是普林斯顿大学访问学者，2000年后在哈佛大学肯尼迪学院和剑桥 大学贾吉商学院先后完成培训学习。他曾在国务院发展研究中心和国家统计局担任领导职务，并于2008年担任国务院研究室主任。整体来看，他在智库的职业发展长达30年。2013年他空降河南担任省长，并在2016年任河南省委书记，这将令他成为下一届中央政治局委员候选人。
中国智库实现真正的“旋转门”仍有待时日。习近平呼吁增加人才在智库和政府间流动，以及他将海归人员招揽入党的做法，令智库成为培养和招揽党的领导人的全新渠道。这一动向的影响还有待进一步研究，或许它将有利于习，令其拓宽权力基础并缓和他与对其统治持批评态度的中国知识分子的关系。但这也可能会在本土培养的领导人和海归领导人之间造成紧张关系。可以肯定的是，这种全新的“旋转门”将给十九大及此后的党的全国代表大会注入多元观点和背景，给中国的国内和国际事务带来一系列新的机遇和挑战。
“Revolving doors” are a common feature of the American political landscape, helping facilitate the fluid exchange of ideas and expertise between government and non-government. At U.S. think tanks, staffs frequently “revolve” out to engage in government service, while former government officials “revolve” in to take their place. Although the term “revolving door” is fairly new to China, the practice is not entirely unfamiliar. China’s “revolving door” has largely operated in one direction, with retired senior party officials moving into think tanks but the reverse rarely occurring. However, Chinese president Xi Jinping’s recent remarks and actions suggest that a full-fledged “revolving door” will become a mainstay of Chinese think tanks in the near future.
Over the last two years, Xi has regularly emphasized the need to strengthen and develop China’s think tanks. In April 2016, he delivered a speech articulating his readiness to employ think tanks as a new venue from which to recruit the party leadership. Xi expressed his vision for “agglomerating talent into research institutions” and “breaking institutional boundaries” to allow for an exchange of talent between the private sector, the government, and think tanks. He explicitly noted that the ‘revolving door’ mechanism commonly observed in foreign think tanks was an asset that China should seek to emulate.”
Over the past decade or so, numerous retired Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders have gone on to join prominent Chinese research institutes and think tanks. The former executive vice president of the Central Party School, Zheng Bijian, served as chairman to the China Reform Forum, a Beijing-based think tank focused on domestic and international issues. Former state councilor Tang Jiaxuan became chairman of the China National Association for International Studies (CNAIS), and later joined the leadership body of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE). Former minister of foreign affairs Li Zhaoxing served as dean of both the Zhou Enlai School of Government at Nankai University and the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at the Institute of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. After retiring as vice premier of the State Council in 2008, Zeng Peiyan became chairman of CCIEE. Similarly, since his retirement in 2012, former state councilor Dai Bingguo has served as chairman of the board of Jinan University and honorary dean of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University. These are only a few of the many examples of former CCP leaders transitioning into influential roles in think tanks.
Movements in the opposite direction—from think tanks into government—are decidedly rare. Substantial leadership experience at the provincial and local levels has long been a prerequisite for becoming a top party leader. But in a departure from CCP norms, President Xi has started to appreciate think tank experience when promoting personnel into his inner circle. Notably, two of Xi’s most valued aides have advanced their careers through government think tanks, and they are now primed to take top positions in the party. Wang Huning, a Politburo member and the director of the CCP Central Committee Policy Research Office—who also served as an advisor to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, rose through academia before making significant strides in the Policy Research Office. Liu He, the director of the CCP Central Committee Office of the Central Economic Leading Group, worked at both the State Information Center and the State Council’s Development Research Center (DRC) before assuming his current position. Wang may further advance his political career in becoming a member of the 19th Politburo Standing Committee, and Liu is a candidate to become vice premier and a member of the Politburo. Remarkably, both Wang and Liu became part of Xi’s inner circle as a result of their abilities as thinkers and advisers; neither one has held a leadership position at the local or provincial levels. These cases indicate that Xi has opened the door for think tank scholars to join the top party leadership.
Xi is also widening the door for foreign-educated returnees to join the leadership. In August 2016, a party directive called for members of the Western Returned Scholars Association (欧美同学会, Oumei tongxuehui) to be recruited into the party. Foreign-educated returnees abound at China’s research institutes and think tanks, especially in the fields of economics and foreign affairs. For instance, since as early as 2005, the entire faculty of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University—24 scholars in total—had studied abroad. Other think tanks, such as the Chinese Economists 50 Forum and the China Finance 40 Forum, also boast high returnee representation. Because foreign-educated returnees dominate the rosters at think tanks, Xi’s emphasis on recruiting these candidates carries the potential to institutionalize a system whereby think tanks help channel scholars into the party leadership.
The composition of Xi’s inner circle reveals his confidence in the abilities of foreign-educated returnees to excel in the party leadership. Xi’s roommate in college, Chen Xi, was a visiting scholar at Stanford University in the early 1990s and is currently executive deputy director of the CCP Central Organization Department, in charge of Xi Jinping’s personnel matters. Fang Xinghai, the vice-chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, received a doctorate from Stanford and currently plays an important role in orchestrating China’s financial reform. Both Wang Huning and Liu He, mentioned above, have studied and lived abroad: Wang was a visiting scholar at the University of Iowa and the University of California, Berkeley, from 1988 to 1989, and Liu received his MPA degree from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
These are not isolated examples. There has been a clear upward trend in the representation of returnees at high levels of the party leadership. Returnees occupied 14.6 percent of all seats in the 18th Central Committee formed in 2012—an increase of 4 and 8.2 percentage points from the 17th Central Committee in 2007 and the 16th Central Committee in 2002, respectively. Though overall numbers remain small, it stands to reason that as the party further embraces returnees, think tanks will be the prime channel through which groups of policy-oriented, forward-looking leaders will emerge. In other words, think tanks will bridge returnees with the party.
The trajectory of Henan party secretary Xie Fuzhan illustrates the extent to which this phenomenon is already taking place. Xie was a visiting scholar at Princeton University from 1991-1992. Since then, he completed executive programs at both the Harvard Kennedy School and the Cambridge Judge Business School in the 2000s. He has held leadership positions at the DRC and the National Bureau of Statistics and in 2008 became director of the Research Office of the State Council. Altogether, his career in think tanks spans three decades. In 2013, he was parachuted into Henan to become governor. In 2016, he rose to become Henan party secretary, which in turn makes him a candidate for a seat on the next Politburo.
A true “revolving door” through China’s think tanks is still in its nascent stages. Xi’s call to increase the exchange of talent between think tanks and the government and his efforts to bring foreign-educated returnees into the party lay the foundation for think tanks to become a new channel for fostering and recruiting party leadership. The impact of this development requires further study: it may work to Xi’s advantage, allowing him broaden his power base and reconcile his relationship with China’s intellectuals who have been critical of his governance, or it could create tensions between domestically trained and foreign-educated leaders. What is certain is that this new “revolving door” will inject diverse viewpoints and backgrounds into the membership of the 19th Party Congress and beyond, raising a new set of opportunities and challenges for China’s domestic and international affairs.
