就在基辅发生爆炸的前一天，抗议者和乌克兰的维克多·亚努科维奇政府之间长达三个月的僵局似乎就要结束了。政府已经同意特赦抗议者，抗议者也开始拆除路障，并撤离其所占领的公共建筑物。亚努科维奇和反对派正在讨论建立联合政府，并恢复限制总统权力的2004年宪法。全世界都嗅到了一种谨慎的轻松气息。但就在协议达后还不到24小时，基辅市中心的一些地方就燃起大火。
2月18日，防暴警察冲上了独立广场，这个地方自去年12月以来就是抗议者的一个宿营地。警察向抗议者投掷缠有钉子和螺丝的眩晕手榴弹，抗议者则以燃烧瓶回击。冲突还使用了实弹。在警察庇护下的便衣暴徒在基辅市中心乱闹。一座被抗议者作为总部和临时医院的工会大楼也燃起大火。目击者说，医生就在餐桌上为受伤者做手术，而防暴警察还从窗外扔进烟雾弹。到2月20日，冲突已致使包括10名警察在内的数十人死亡，数百人受伤。
这是乌克兰独立22年以来最为惨烈的暴力冲突，而且还远没结束。政府和反对派成员2月19日签署的停火协议很快就被破坏。随着更多的死亡情况被报道，国防部说已准备动用武装力量。如果像许多人所担心的那样，乌克兰陷入内战，这将是对欧洲安全底线的考验。这个国家直到最近还将其目标定为加入欧盟，又怎么会突然变成一个战场呢？
从橙色到血红色
在所有1991年获得独立的前苏联加盟共和国中，乌克兰无疑是最被动的国家之一。她也是其中最富的国家之一。那时她拥有5200万人口（目前降到4600万），国土面积仅比法国略小，气候宜人，土壤肥沃，面朝黑海，拥有了所有走向繁荣的条件。但不像爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛等波罗的海国家那样，乌克兰从来没有为争取独立主权而战斗过，也没有利用她获得的自主权建立现代国家制度。其精英反而将独立视为掠夺国家的权力，不与他人分享收益。
这一问题，是由工业化的、说俄语的东部地区和克里米亚、民族主义情结盛行的西部地区（乌克兰西部地区曾是波兰、奥匈帝国的一部分，直到1939年才根据斯大林与纳粹德国签订的互不侵犯条约并入苏联）的深深的分化导致的。将乌克兰团结为一个整体的是基辅，所有人都认可它的首都地位。
当下危机的种子是由亚努科维奇埋下的。2004年，他试图通过不正当手段获得总统竞选的胜利，但最终被大规模的示威抗议所挫败，其竞争对手维克多·尤先科和尤利娅·季莫申科最终获胜。这即是广为人知的橙色革命，这场革命最终因亚努科维奇的引路人兼支持者列昂尼德·库奇马拒绝其所敦促的使用武力镇压抗议而和平结束。
2010年，亚努科维奇击败尤先科及其团队，当选为乌克兰总统。对乌克兰的政治变幻和统治集团内部纷争厌烦了的西方因此舒了一口气，对这一结果也表示欢迎。西方国家对他的集权视而不见，还认为这是在恢复秩序。他们更担心亚努科维奇与俄罗斯的天然气交易和俄罗斯的黑海舰队，却忽视了他照搬克里姆林宫的统治体制、监禁季莫申科女士，以及操控资金流入其家人及亲近朋友手中。
欧盟领导人忍着厌恶之情，仍与亚努科维奇就乌克兰加入欧盟及双方的自由贸易协议进行谈判，希望借此使乌克兰靠近欧洲。他们认为亚努科维奇会这样做，也以此说服自己进行谈判。然而，亚努科维奇却利用与欧盟的谈判来获取俄罗斯的资金和政治支持，俄罗斯又反过来抓住这一机会加强她对乌克兰的控制。俄罗斯急切地想要把乌克兰拉入她与白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦发起的关税联盟。2013年11月，亚努科维奇与俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京举行了秘密会晤，后者承诺向乌克兰提供廉价天然气和150亿美元信用额度，并且不批评其人权状况，之后亚努科维奇就抛弃了与欧盟的协议。
当数百人，主要是学生走上街头抗议这种180o大转变时，亚努科维奇本能地（也或许是在其克里姆林宫支持者的建议下）派出军队进行镇压。第二天，被这种武力镇压震惊了的乌克兰民众成千上万地涌入独立广场，也就是橙色革命爆发的场所。转眼间，问题就不再是与欧盟的自由贸易协议或与俄罗斯的关税联盟，而是转变为选择腐败、独裁的后苏联式统治，还是选择欧洲的治理方式。与乌克兰和欧盟达成的任何协议相比，它对克里姆林宫造成的威胁都更严重。前苏联加盟共和国的操斯拉夫语的人民想要摆脱苏联留下的阴影，而俄罗斯却是要强化它。
刚开始，在独立广场宿营地，人们挥舞国旗，唱着国歌，还是一派庆祝国庆的节日气氛。来自中产阶层的抗议者要求对包括惯于妥协的反对派在内的政治制度进行彻底改革。抗议者的核心人员来自西部，他们不认可亚努科维奇对他们的统治权威。用障碍物防护起来的独立广场成了基辅市内的一块自由领地，它所建立的规则使它拥有高于亚努科维奇政府及其俄罗斯支持者的道德优越感，后者企图把抗议者抹黑成民族主义激进分子。这场示威抗议使亚努科维奇和反对派都吃了一惊，反对派领导人试图掌握抗议动向，但他们从来没能做到。
对亚努科维奇来说，如果要按照他自己的条件对付抗议者，首先必须使其成为激进主义分子。这也正是过去的三个月里所发生的事情。乌克兰当局拒绝对抗议者的要求做出回应，却假装要与各反对派领导人进行谈判，而各反对派各有自己的利益。在寒风中露营两个多月后，仍然看不到有什么结果，抗议者也感到泄气。为使局势激化，亚努科维奇通过严厉的法律制裁向抗议者挑衅，这明显是套用了俄罗的做法，即凡超出法律对示威抗议所做严格规定的人均被宣判为罪犯。
1月22日，那些厌倦了政府和反对派的连篇空话、渴望行动的抗议者与警察发生冲突，并向其投掷燃烧瓶。警察做出反击。冲突最终导致5人死亡，数十人受伤，约有25人失踪。然而和开始时一样，暴力冲突突然戛然而止，但气氛已经发生了变化。俄罗斯国家电视台将示威者描绘成受到西方支持的激进分子和恐怖分子。
一段时间的冲突过后，局势终于有所稳定。亚努科维奇取消了部分苛克法律规定，并同意总理阿扎罗夫在1月28日辞职。亚努科维奇有意让亚岑秋克（季莫申科所在政党的领导人）担任总理一职，但遭到拒绝。乌克兰局势缓解之时，亚努科维奇还参加了索契冬奥会的开幕式。
然而平静并没有持续多久。在迫使反对派陷入持续但毫无结果的谈判时，亚努科维奇似乎正在集结军队准备进行武力镇压。因为担心冲突从乌克兰蔓延到俄罗斯，克里姆林宫也开始着手应对此次危机。它压制了那些积极报道抗议的媒体，并起诉本国的反政府示威者。俄罗斯将乌克兰的信用额度又增加了20亿美元。同时，Sergei Glazyev，普京的乌克兰问题顾问，公开呼吁亚努科维奇使用武力对抗“恐怖分子”，以防止混乱进一步升级。
局势的短暂缓和，使聚集在独立广场的人们有时间补充弹药和防护装备。三周多以来，大部分“广场自卫队”中年轻的男性志愿者充当着抗议营地的卫兵，守卫着路障，分派临时凑起来的武器和防护设备，谈论着即将到来的战斗。部分激进的反对派决定继续向亚努科维奇施压。他们要求修改宪法，使乌克兰重新回到2010年亚努科维奇掌权之前的议会制共和国。2月18日，由于路障被撤除，反对派领导人呼吁对议会大楼发起“和平进攻”。
问题是这样的攻击显然不可能是“和平”的。反对派政客警告说，亚努科维奇正在寻找借口借以摧毁抗议者的阵营，终结示威活动。当他的派系拒绝在议会讨论宪法改革时，抗议活动又爆发了。有人点燃了挡住道路的重型卡车，而警察也渴望战斗。最终，乌克兰最血腥的一天开始了。
东方与西方在这里相遇
在乌克兰的主权问题上，普京从未让步，他认为乌克兰不是一个独立国家，并最终会归属于俄罗斯。对他来说，欧盟试图与乌克兰签署入盟协议的举动，和北约试图于2008年纳入格鲁吉亚一样，令人愤怒。这导致俄罗斯与格鲁吉亚之间爆发了一次持续5天的战争，使格鲁吉亚分裂地区被俄军占领，并禁止北约进驻。那时的经验教训可能在乌克兰问题上派上了用场。苏尔科夫，克里姆林宫负责处理格鲁吉亚要求分离的阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯问题的顾问，一直在为普京处理乌克兰危机，也被发现现身于基辅和克里米亚。
亚努科维奇认为，他是为了获得俄罗斯的金融支持而拒绝与欧盟签署协议。但普京并不信任亚努科维奇，他需要更进一步确保乌克兰对俄罗斯的依赖。这场由激进分子引发的国内冲突，不仅阻止了欧盟和西方国家进行的干预，还可能使俄罗斯控制乌克兰部分地区，包括克里米亚——俄罗长期以来垂涎三尺的地方。
接下来会发生什么?虽然乌克兰西部地区已经拒绝亚努科维奇的统治，但是南部和东部地区还在动员人民支持当局，并呼吁总统果断应对反叛行为。安全部门的负责人说，西部地区的示威者已经占领了警察局和军火库。在克里米亚，由于俄罗斯族占居民多数，且俄罗斯海军舰队驻扎于此，因此将成为下一个热点地区。2月20日，该地区议会议长建议该地区可以脱离乌克兰。
Glazyev呼吁乌克兰在“民族自决”的基础上，实行联邦制，并宣称俄罗斯有责任进行干预。与此同时，美国在宣布禁止向20名乌克兰政府官员发放签证后，措辞也更为严厉。2月19日，巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)将乌克兰描述为“俄罗斯的附属国”，并称乌克兰不应该被视为“美俄竞赛的冷战棋盘”。在独立广场，警察和抗议者互相射击和投掷汽油炸弹。这就是一个游戏。
（第一智库网初步翻译，仅供参考）
Europe’s new battlefield
ONLY a day before Kiev exploded， it had seemed that a three-month-long stand-off between protesters and the government of President Viktor Yanukovych was ending. The government had agreed to an amnesty for protesters who， in turn， began to dismantle their barricades and leave the public buildings they had occupied. MrYanukovych and the opposition were talking about a coalition government and a return to the 2004 constitution， which limited presidential powers. The world breathed a wary sigh of relief. Yet less than 24 hours later the agreement， and parts of central Kiev， were in flames.
On February 18th riot police stormed Independence Square (Maidan)， the scene of a protest camp since December. Officers threw percussion grenades taped up with nails and bolts at protesters， who responded with Molotov cocktails. Live ammunition was used. Plain-clothes thugs， under police protection， rampaged through the centre of Kiev. A trade-union building， which had served as the protesters’ headquarters and had been turned into a makeshift hospital， was in flames. Witnesses said doctors operated on dining tables as riot police threw smoke grenades through the windows. By February 20th dozens of people， including ten policemen， had been killed and hundreds injured.
It is the worst violence Ukraine has known in its 22 years as an independent country， and it is not over. A truce agreed by the government and members of the opposition on February 19th quickly broke down. As more deaths were reported， the defence ministry said it was preparing to use the armed forces. If Ukraine descends into civil war， as many now fear， European security could be tested to the limit. How did this country， which until recently had its sights set on membership of the European Union， turn into a war zone?
From orange to blood-red
Of all the former Soviet republics that won independence in 1991，Ukraine was arguably the most passive. It was also among the richest. Then a country of 52m people (its population has since shrunk to 46m) in an area a little smaller than France， blessed with a good climate， rich land and access to the Black Sea， Ukraine had every reason to prosper. Yet unlike the Baltic states of Estonia， Latvia and Lithuania， it never fought for its sovereignty and did not use its new powers of self-determination to turn itself into a modern state. Instead， Ukraine’s elites understood independence as a right to pillage their country， without having to share the proceeds with anyone.
Compounding the problem is a deeply buried division between the Russian-speaking，industrialised east of the country and Crimea， and the nationalist-minded western Ukraine， once part of Poland and Austria-Hungary until it was annexed by Stalin as part of a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1939. What held the whole country together was Kiev，recognised by all as the capital.
The seeds of the current crisis were planted by MrYanukovych. In 2004 he tried to steal the presidential election， but was defied by mass protests that instead swept his opponents， Viktor Yushchenko and YuliaTymoshenko， to power. That protest， better known as the orange revolution， ended peacefully when MrYanukovych’s predecessor and backer， Leonid Kuchma， refused to use force against protesters， as MrYanukovych urged.
Yet such were the failures of MrYushchenko and his team that in 2010 the country democratically elected MrYanukovych as its president. Tired of Ukraine’s soap-opera politics and the squabbles within its ruling team， the West greeted the arrival of MrYanukovych with some relief. It turned a blind eye to his accumulation of ever more political power， interpreting it as a return to order. It was more worried by MrYanukovych’s deals with Russia over gas and the Russian Black Sea fleet than it was by the fact that he was replicating the Kremlin’s system of governance， jailing MsTymoshenko and steering cash into the hands of his family and close friends.
Holding their noses， European Union leaders negotiated with MrYanukovych over an association and free-trade agreement that was supposed to move Ukraine closer to Europe. They persuaded themselves that MrYanukovych could deliver. Instead， he used the negotiations to extract money and political guarantees from Russia， which in turn seized the chance to tighten its grip over Ukraine，which it was keen to include in a customs union of its own with Belarus and Kazakhstan. After a secret meeting in November with Vladimir Putin， Russia’s president， who promised cheap gas， a $15 billion credit-line and no awkward questions about human rights，MrYanukovych ditched the EU deal.
When a few hundred people， mainly students， took to the streets to protest against this U-turn，MrYanukovych dealt with them as his instinct (and， perhaps， his new Kremlin patrons) advised him: he sent in troops to beat them up. The next day， appalled by such violence， hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians poured out onto the Maidan，scene of the orange revolution. Suddenly it was no longer an issue of a free-trade agreement with the EU or a customs union with Russia. It was about an existential choice between a corrupt and authoritarian post-Soviet system of governance and a European one. This was a more serious threat to the Kremlin than any agreement with the EU. People in a Slavic former Soviet republic were trying to shake off its Soviet legacy， even as Russia itself was tightening the screws.
The initial Maidanencampment had the atmosphere of a festival celebrating the birth of the nation. People waved Ukrainian flags and sang the national anthem. Middle-class protesters came to demand an overhaul of the political system， including its compromised opposition. The core of the protesters was made up of people from western Ukraine who refused to recogniseMrYanukovych’sauthority over them. Defended by barricades， the Maidan turned into a free territory inside Kiev. Its discipline gave it a moral superiority over MrYanukovych’s government and his Russian backers， who tried to portray the protesters as nationalist radicals. Both MrYanukovych and the opposition were taken by surprise. Opposition leaders tried to ride the popularity of the protest， but they were never fully in charge of it.
For MrYanukovych to deal with the protesters on his own terms， they first had to be radicalised. This is what has happened over the past three months. The government refused to respond to the protesters’ demands， while pretending to negotiate with opposition leaders， each of whom had his own interests. After two months of camping out in the cold and with no results in sight， the protesters started to get frustrated. To raise the temperature MrYanukovych provoked them with draconian laws， apparently copied from Russia’s play-book， which criminalized everybody out demonstrating.
On January 22nd protesters hungry for action and tired of empty talk from both the government and the opposition clashed with the police， lobbing Molotov cocktails. The police shot back. Five people were killed and dozens injured. Some 25 people went missing. The violence stopped as suddenly as it had begun， but the atmosphere had changed. Russian state television portrayed the protesters as Western-sponsored radicals and terrorists.
A period of clashes was followed by calm. MrYanukovych cancelled the draconian laws and surrendered his prime minister，MykolaAzarov， who resigned on January 28th. MrYanukovych offered the post to ArsenyYatseniuk， leader of MsTymoshenko’s party， who turned it down. The quietening of tensions in Ukraine coincided with the grand opening of the Sochi winter Olympics， which was attended by MrYanukovych.
The calm did not last. While keeping the opposition distracted with prolonged and fruitless negotiations，MrYanukovych， it seems， was marshalling his forces for a crackdown. Worried about contagion spreading from Ukraine to Russia， the Kremlin too was making its own preparations. It steamrollered media outlets that had favourably reported on the protests， and prosecuted its own anti-government protesters. It extended Ukraine’s credit line by another $2 billion as Sergei Glazyev， an adviser to Mr Putin on Ukraine， openly called on MrYanukovych to use force against “terrorists” to prevent chaos.
The lull also allowed people on the Maidan to equip themselves with ammunition and protective gear. For more than three weeks the mostly young， male volunteers of the so-called Maidan Self-defence Brigades had been playing soldiers in and around the protest camp， guarding the barricades， decorating their makeshift weapons and armour and talking about the battle to come. The emboldened opposition decided to increase the pressure on MrYanukovych. They demanded a constitutional change that would turn Ukraine back into the parliamentary republic it was before MrYanukovych took power in 2010. On February 18th， as the barricades came down， opposition leaders called for a “peaceful attack” on the parliament.
The risk that it would not remain peaceful was clear to all. Opposition politicians warned that MrYanukovych was seeking an excuse to storm the camp and put an end to the demonstrations. When his faction refused to discuss the constitutional reform in parliament， protests flared. Someone set alight the heavy trucks that had been blocking the roads， and the police， desperate for a fight， charged. The bloodiest day in Ukraine unfolded.
Where east meets west
Mr Putin has never come to terms with Ukraine’s sovereignty， seeing the country as a non-state which ultimately belongs to Russia. He saw the EU’s attempt to sign a deal with Ukraine as little more palatable than NATO’s attempt to draw in Georgia in 2008. That resulted in a five-day war between Russia and Georgia， leaving separatist parts of Georgia occupied by Russian forces and off-limits for NATO. Experiences gathered then may have come in handy in Ukraine. VladislavSurkov， a Kremlin adviser who is formally in charge of dealing with the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia， has been handling the Ukraine crisis for Mr Putin， and has been spotted in Kiev and Crimea.
MrYanukovych believed that he was trading his refusal to sign an agreement with the EU for Russia’s financial backing. But Mr Putin， who places little trust in MrYanukovych， needed firmer guarantees of Ukraine’s dependence on Russia. A civil conflict， blamed on the radicals， not only deters the EU and the West from meddling， but could also give Russia dominance over parts of Ukraine， including Crimea， which it has long coveted.
Ukraine’s ruler， and Victor Yanukovych
What next? The western parts of Ukraine have rejected MrYanukovych’s rule， while the southern and eastern regions are mobilising people in support of the regime and calling on the president to deal with the rebels decisively. The head of the security service has said that police stations and arms depots are being seized by protesters in the west of the country. Crimea， which has an ethnic-Russian majority and which is home to a Russian naval fleet， could be the next hot spot. On February 20th the head of its parliament suggested that the region could secede from Ukraine.
MrGlazyev has called for the federalisation of Ukraine， with a right to “self-determination”， and has asserted that Russia has an obligation to intervene in the country. Meanwhile America， which has announced visa bans on 20 members of Ukraine’s government， has toughened its own rhetoric. Describing Ukraine as a “client state of Russia”， on February 19th Barack Obama said that Ukraine should not be seen as “some cold-war chessboard in which we are in competition with Russia”. In the Maidan， as police and protesters exchange live rounds and petrol bombs， it is anything but a game.
