经济因素将会继续成为中欧关系的支柱。一个双边自由贸易协定（FTA）在未来几年间可能成为现实，从而促进经济发展和增加就业机会。然而，在政治军事互信方面，双方还有很大潜力可挖。虽然双方关于此方面的接触还停留在初级阶段，但是作为未来可能形成的战略伙伴关系的决定性因素，政治军事值得双方慎重考虑，尤其是鉴于中欧合作对全球安全可能带来的改变。
事实上，欧盟仍被广泛视为一个主要的非军事力量，人们还普遍质疑，欧盟能否成为一个完整意义上的的政治军事事务成员。但是，根据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所（SIPRI）的研究报告，欧盟27个成员国2012年的国防开支总和，达到了2870亿美元（占欧盟GDP的1.7%），数额仅次于美国。虽然此类统计数据无法反应全部情况（对任何一方都是如此），但是，同样根据SIPRI的研究报告，中国2012年的国防预算达到了1580亿美元——但中国政府宣称在1060亿美元左右——这相当于中国GDP的2%。
如果欧盟成员国希望的话，欧盟可以在涉及政治及军事议题上更加积极地与中国展开交流。在里斯本条约生效及欧盟对外事务部成立后，欧盟开始了与北京的安全对话。2011年以来，欧盟外交和安全政策高级代表凯瑟琳·阿什顿定期与中国国防部长会晤，同时，欧盟军事委员会主席也与中国人民解放军的相关人士展开平等对话。
欧中对话反映了一些欧盟成员国已经开展的行动。例如，法国、英国和德国已经与北京建立了“战略对话机制”，并辅以开展对中国军官培训的活动，以及实现互惠互利的高层互访。中法及中英合作还包括了港口停靠和开展海上联合搜救演习。
欧盟和中国已经在冲突预防、危机管理和冲突后重建方面开展合作。索马里沿岸的欧盟反海盗海军力量，已经实际测试了一些欧盟国家和中国海军的合作能力。在黎巴嫩，双方的维和部队在联合国旗帜下展开合作；在其他还仍在进行的联合国—欧盟行动（刚果民主共和国、南苏丹、马里）中，双方也有合作。
未来的合作可能包括：
（1） 建立欧盟军事委员和中国人民解放军间有组织的对话机制，包括任命一位驻北京的欧盟代表团的国防安全顾问；
（2） 支持中国参与欧盟共同安全与防务政策（CSDP）行动，尤其是那些涉及到非洲领土和海域的地区；
（3） 开展有针对性的联合军事演习，包括反海盗演习、人道主义救援演习和行动。
目前中欧之间没有会引发双方军事对抗的重大争议性问题。在没有其亚洲盟友阻碍的情况下，欧盟可与北京在政治和军事方面进行交流，同时维持与美国的同盟关系，以及与东盟（ASEAN）的建设性合作伙伴关系。如果欧盟能够设法兼顾好上述多边关系，并且同时发展与传统盟友美国和新伙伴中国的合作，那么她将在维护全球安全方面获得更多机会（和影响力），并（通过调解、对话和能力建设）在减少全球及地区冲突（包括华盛顿与北京间）上发挥建设性作用。
这将会使得中欧伙伴关系变得具有“战略性”，同时也为亟待建立的美国—欧盟—中国三边对话机制（更进一步地为建立三方合作机制）以讨论全球共同面对的问题提供基础。
（第一智库初步翻译，仅供参考）
Economic factors will continue to form the backbone of the EU-China relationship. A bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) could become reality in the next few years, leading to further economic growth and job creation. Yet it is in the domain of politico-military affairs where there is the greatest potential to foster trust between the two sides. Although this dimension is still in its infancy, it nevertheless deserves serious consideration as a potentially defining element of the strategic partnership in the future, especially given the difference that such cooperation could make to global security.
It is true that the Union is still largely perceived as a mainly civilian power and doubts continue to exist regarding the capacity of the EU to become a fully-fledged player in politico-military affairs. And yet, according to SIPRI, the combined EU-27 defence expenditure for 2012 amounted to $287 billion (1.7% of the EU’s GDP), second only to the US. Although such aggregate figures do not tell the whole story (on either side), again according to SIPRI, China’s defence budget for 2012 amounted to some $158 billion – whereas the Chinese government claims it to be around $106 billion – equivalent to 2% of GDP.
If its member states so wished, the EU could engage China effectively on political and military affairs. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, a security dialogue with Beijing has been set in motion. Since 2011, HR/VP Catherine Ashton also meets regularly with the Chinese defence minister, while the head of the EU Military Committee engages in a parallel dialogue with his counterpart in the PLA.
The EU-China dialogue mirrors initiatives undertaken by some individual EU member states. France, the United Kingdom and Germany, for instance, have each set up a ‘strategic dialogue’ with Beijing, complemented by the training of Chinese military officers and reciprocal high-level visits. Sino-French and Sino-British cooperation also include port calls and joint naval search-and-rescue exercises.
The EU and China already work together in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation. EUNAVFOR Somalia off the coast of Somalia has already tested practical cooperation between the navies of some EU member states and China. Peacekeepers from the two sides operate under the UN flag in Lebanon as well as in other ongoing UN-EU operations (DRC, South Sudan, Mali).
Future cooperation could also include:
(i) a structured dialogue mechanism between the EU Military Committee and the PLA, including the appointment of a defence and security advisor to the EU Delegation in Beijing;
(ii) support for China’s participation in CSDP missions, in particular those in African territories and seas;
(iii) targeted joint military activities, including counter-piracy drills and humanitarian rescue exercises and operations.
There are currently no major contentious issues between China and the EU that could bring the two sides to a military confrontation. Unhindered by binding alliances in Asia, Europeans can engage Beijing in political and military affairs, while remaining loyal allies to the US and constructive partners to ASEAN. If the Union could manage to square this circle and advance cooperation with both its traditional American ally and a new Chinese partner, it would then have more opportunities (and leverage) to contribute to global security and play a constructive role (i.a. through mediation, dialogue and capacity-building) in reducing global as well as regional tensions, including between Washington and Beijing.
This would make the EU-China partnership truly ‘strategic’, preparing also the ground for a much needed US-EU-China trilateral dialogue mechanism – and thereby cooperation – on the so-called ‘global commons’.
原文链接：http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_35_EU-China_partnership.pdf
