当欧洲安全与合作委员会（OSCE）外长齐聚基辅时，在乌克兰爆发的的游行示威变得难以预测。总统亚努科维奇正尝试与欧盟重新展开谈判，然而反对派也愈加有组织性。暴力镇压的可能性依然存在；一些人正在脱离乌克兰政权，但仍有迹象显示，当局正重新巩固政权。然而，经过数日的街头示威游行，是时候进行一些总结思考了。
另一场“橙色革命”？
爆发过一次革命的国家往往还会有第二次（想想法国）；尤其是，当第一次被认为是失败后，会为将来留下许多未尽的事业。最为类似的是，民众重新作为影响乌克兰政治的重要因素。2004年“橙色革命”后，在乌克兰多次政改失败中，其中最令人沮丧的一项特征是，人们变得冷漠了。示威游行变成了一桩生意：每个示威游行都是虚假的，人们收钱上街游行。因此，乌克兰重新出现了真正的游行示威，这改变了反对派和政府的态度。第一次大规模示威游行中，人们高举着“我们没有收费”的横幅。但是，乌克兰官方认为，这是由国内寡头或外国势力“资助”的虚伪的示威，这样的宣传使得当局名誉扫地。在俄罗斯或东乌克兰，也许还有人相信这样的说辞；但是，在基辅，所有人都知道这不是事实。然而，这与“橙色革命”仍然存在着本质性区别。“橙色革命”主要是围绕着一次关键事件——选举舞弊——发生的，因此，结果也更为清晰。此外，亚努科维奇这次并没有犯明显的错误（2004年正是他的竞选团队在总统大选中舞弊）；然而，政府采取进一步暴力行为可能改变整个局面。
和该地区不同背景的其他专制领导人一样，亚努科维奇近年来不断巩固自身的防卫力量。2004年，安全部队被分解，现在他们变得更为强大。2012年以来（欧洲足球锦标赛安全落幕后），当局便日渐通过雇佣暴徒来袭击和平示威者，并将舞台上带有暴力的表演视为煽动行为，随后还通过天花乱坠的封面故事，将这群暴徒美化为“反法西斯”组织。这种现象人尽皆知，以至于当地人称之为——titushkas。作为同样反对“政治手腕”的一部分，反对派还发布了如何应对这些问题的指令。最后，还有一些关于“革命”的演说。市政厅被人群占领，并被人在外墙上涂上了“革命中心”的字眼。但是，迄今为止，这更像是“政治失常”时期。2012年中期，俄罗斯终于结束了2011年大选后所出现的“政治失常”时期。因此，我们还不知道同样的事情是否会在乌克兰发生。
精英在算计什么？
实际上，社交网络所抗议的内容，以及示威者并不在意反对派是否掌权，这样的事实令反对派领导人措手不及。不可避免的是，议会反对党一个星期前就决定推出三个候选人（克利奇科、亚采纽克、田纽伯科）参加2015年大选，他们已经参与到了类似赢取公众支持的竞争中。其中，克利奇科似乎将会赢得大选。
类似的冲突同样存在于统治精英中。这些精英中既有分崩离析的迹象，也有重整旗鼓的势头。精英们也许正在考虑脱党，但他们也会考虑其他人会不会这么做。人们并不清楚议员是如何从执政党中辞职的。例如，乌克兰总统幕僚长先是辞职，随后又突然复职。12月3日，乌克兰执政党地区党轻松地击败了反对派第一次推翻政府的尝试（提案仅得到了450票中186票的支持）。
俄罗斯失算了吗？
今年夏天以来，俄罗斯就一直向“东部伙伴关系”六国，以及主办上周峰会的立陶宛施加压力。由于亚美尼亚于9月宣布退出此次峰会，白俄罗斯成为峰会的边缘与会国；鉴于阿塞拜疆能源供应国地位，且不论对错，她被作为一个特例。那些参加维尔纽斯峰会的国家做出一副若无其事的样子。然而实际上，他们都不愿意使用诸如“灾难”甚至是“失望”的字眼，担心这样会让人误以为他们赞成俄罗斯的立场。但在峰会结束时，俄罗斯人非常高兴。据俄罗斯外交和国防政策委员会主席卢科亚诺夫所说，“在过去的几周内，局势变成了俄罗斯与欧盟间的零和博弈。战术上说，俄罗斯明显赢了。”
然而现在看来，当地缘政治胜利到来时，尤其是还伴随着前景可怕的“颜色革命”（表面上的），局势已变得迥然不同。橙色革命给克林姆林宫留下了深刻印象。2004年以来，普京投入大量精力避免俄罗斯爆发此类抗议示威，还秘密帮助乌克兰及其他邻国应对此类事件。然而现在示威人群重新在乌克兰出现。他们还利用了和平示威、社交网络等“技术”进行示威，这与“阿拉伯之春”如出一辙，这使克林姆林宫忧心忡忡。
2004年，虽然俄罗斯政权危机重重，但并没有爆发革命的迹象。然而现在，这种可能性是存在的。2011—12年，普京曾经从对他的抗议浪潮中挺了过来，当时示威者徒然地讨论着要组织一个“俄罗斯广场”（运动）。也许现在他们没有足够力量再次组织游行示威，但是普京已经在考虑如何阻挠他们了。俄罗斯的博客空间和推特充斥着人们关于“支持乌克兰加入欧盟运动”的评论和比较——“如果他们能成功，为什么我们不行？”然而，现在普京当然不会像亚努科维奇一样漏洞百出。俄罗斯的政府和经济相比之下更加强大。但是展望中期，前景突然不那么明朗了。在接下来的几个月，普京实施的国内外政策会告诉我们，他从基辅事件中汲取了什么样的经验教训。
多米诺骨牌效应能逆转吗？
维尔纽斯峰会结束时，人们担心俄罗斯会对两个仅存的“成功案例”——摩尔多瓦和格鲁吉亚进一步施压。上述两国当然也会密切关注乌克兰局势，如果乌克兰示威取得成功的话，他们将会受到极大鼓舞。如果示威成功，这可能会引发一场大规模的民主复兴，否则，又可能是一次民主的幻灭。
欧盟做错了什么？
对于欧盟来说，维尔纽斯峰会和其他相关事件为其提供了一次健康的，但又痛苦的经验教训。从此次事件中得出正确的结论非常重要。首先，长期以来，欧盟对乌克兰内部冲突、计算和权力关系的真正本质缺乏了解，对于俄罗斯和乌克兰之间关系的意义和实质也同样认识不清。欧盟希望现实的发展能按部就班。当实际情况与之相悖时，欧盟缺少一个备选方案。最后，欧盟既没有坚持自己的原则，也没有处理好权力关系。
欧盟过于关注季莫申科一案。反对非法关押季莫申科并不是一个错误。但是，亚努科维奇政权并不愿意就这一问题做出让步，欧盟也并没有想过分析乌克兰当局的其他需求和弱点。欧盟特使科克斯和科瓦斯涅斯基关注面过于局限，且容易被人利用。欧盟应该继续要求释放季莫申科，但应将其纳入讨论更广泛议题的框架内。这就是说，一旦释放季莫申科成为乌克兰与欧盟签署条约最重要明确的条件，那么欧盟在谈判最新进展中完全忘记她是错误的。
辩证地来看，亚努科维奇的不情愿，使欧盟避免在维尔纽斯峰会与乌克兰签署一个不成熟协议。如果欧盟同意乌克兰部分不合理要求，在季莫申科未得到释放的情况下签署条约，那么欧盟将颜面尽失。维尔纽斯峰会前，乌克兰总理阿扎罗夫声称，该国需要“1500亿到1650亿间欧元”的援助，来帮助其实现现代化。然而到12月3日，他把要求降低到100亿欧元。某种程度上，欧盟卷入了一场价格战，并默默地接受了俄罗斯的零和博弈，但却没有发挥自身软实力的优势。欧盟没有做好应对此类竞争的准备。
现在，欧盟应该学会结合规则程序和实际情况，以发挥更有效的作用。在处理与乌克兰关系时，欧盟需要遵循规则程序方式，但此方式应在设立严格条件的前提下，准备向其提供一些更为亟需的经济支援（而不是向其直接提供资金，这是欧盟做出的正确选择）。
无论是在关于东部伙伴关系，还是更广泛的背景下，欧盟都应集思广益，灵活处理与俄罗斯的关系。如果在不久的将来，乌克兰重新考虑后，迫切希望与欧盟签署协议，那么欧盟应做好充分准备，对抗俄罗斯必定会施加的压力。基于乌克兰民众的热情及其对精英阶层的影响，这也不是完全不现实的。第二次机会随时都可能出现，欧盟应该有更充分的准备。
同时，欧盟应该积极通过更灵活的方式去接纳乌克兰最好的欧洲人——这个国家的民间团体。
近期欧盟和世界应该如何应对？
欧盟应反复强调政府暴力行为的非法性。同时，通过强调人们会监视政府雇佣暴徒搞破坏的行为，来向乌克兰政府施压。通过抹黑示威人群，宣称他们首先使用暴力，这样的宣传是不可信的。任何与周六暴力事件类似的行为，都是违法的，示威必须遵守秩序。
在欧安组织部长级理事会，包括欧盟对外勤务部中，出席的人应该越多越好。会议上的安保级别不应过于严格。每一个欧盟部长都会受到人群的热烈欢迎。这是警告乌克兰当局，镇压行为都将面临制裁的最佳时机，正如在白俄罗斯2010年大选后一样。对乌克兰精英阶层来说，这是个更大的威胁。
欧盟应该对任何一方的调解请求做出及时的回应，尤其是当俄罗斯首先提出时。
需要强调的是，维尔纽斯峰会提出的协议仍然未有定论。如果政府改组，那么乌克兰将会更愿意回到谈判桌上。如果她的政府完全更迭，那么欧盟应该在2014年3月召开下一次欧盟-乌克兰峰会前随时准备召开峰会以签署协议。如果乌克兰提前回到谈判桌（同时其布鲁塞尔代表团不再提出更多要求），那么欧盟必须坚持最初的条件，否则就是背判了基辅的游行示威者。
在维尔纽斯峰会上，乌克兰的敲诈勒索无法令人接受。对于拒绝向乌克兰政权提供资金的决定，欧盟不能也不应该重新考虑。但是，对于受制于俄罗斯贸易限制的乌克兰，欧盟可以帮助其开放商品服务市场。她能帮助乌克兰扫除通往IMF的障碍，但是同样，乌克兰必须进行必要的改革。乌克兰需要展望一下作为欧洲一部分的未来。因此，欧盟不应充当防止乌克兰自食其果的保护伞，而是应专注于帮助其加入欧盟。
欧盟的对乌政策，必须从原来精英和技术性的方式，转为支持乌克兰民间团体的方式。一旦乌克兰采取和摩尔多瓦一样的步骤，她就能迅速获得签证自由。欧盟应该加大对2014年1月正式开启的“伊拉斯莫斯教育交流项目”好处的宣传。
前段时间，由于多起关于“选择性正义”的问题，欧盟一直督促乌克兰改革其法律制度。在乌克兰当局使用武力对抗她的人民后，这一问题变得更为重要。目前，整个法律、安全和司法体系的去政治化，成为了一大问题，而欧盟可以通过签署欧盟-乌克兰协议，帮助其加强法治建设。因此，欧盟也应该避免谈及“政变”。这取决于乌克兰人民自己是否愿意更换其政府。长远来看，更为重要的是政府治理的质量和法治社会的建立：如果反对派掌权，我们应该确保他们为乌克兰政坛制定新的游戏规则。欧盟也就能帮到这里了。欧盟应该阐明，如果乌克兰认真对待欧盟，那么欧盟也会认真对待她。
（“第一智库”网初步翻译，仅供参考）
The Ukrainian #Euromaidan
As the OSCE foreign ministers gather in Kiev, the outcome of the protests in Ukraine is uncertain. It would be foolish to make predictions. President Yanukovych is exploring re-negotiation with the EU; the opposition is getting more organised. A violent crackdown is still a possibility; some are defecting from the regime, but there are also some signs that the regime is re-consolidating itself. But after several days of mass street protests, it is a good time to think about some general issues.
Is this another ‘Orange Revolution’?
Countries that have a revolution often have another one (think of France); especially if the first is deemed to be unsuccessful, leaving unfinished business behind. The most important similarity is the return of the crowd as a factor in Ukrainian politics. One of the most depressing features of Ukraine’s many failures after the Orange Revolution in 2004 was that people became apathetic. Political demonstration became a business: every demonstration was a fake, people were paid to protest. So the return of real protests changes the dynamics, for both opposition and government. Participants at the first big demo held up signs saying “we are not being paid”. The authorities are relying on the tired and discredited narrative that this is an artificial protest ”paid for” by domestic oligarchs or foreign powers. Some may believe this in Russia or in eastern Ukraine; but in Kiev everyone knows this not to be true. There are important structural differences, however. The Orange Revolution was centredaround a pivotal event – a rigged election – so the endgame was clearer. Moreover, Yanukovych has not done anything so clearly wrong this time (it was his campaign team that rigged the 2004 election); though further regime violence would change the picture.
Yanukovych, like other authoritarian leaders of various shades in the region, has been building up his defences in recent years. The security forces were split in 2004; now they are much stronger. Since 2012 (once the European Football Championship Finals were safely out of the way), the regime has been increasingly reliant on hired thugs to attack peaceful protestors or stage violence as agents provocateurs, with the flimsiest of cover stories that these are ‘anti-fascist’ groups. The phenomenon is so well-known they even have a local name – titushkas. As part of the same fight-back against ‘political technology’, opposition activists have issued instructions on how to deal with them. Finally, there is some talk of ‘revolution’. The occupied city hall has ‘centre of the revolution’ graffited on the outside. But so far this is more like a period of ‘abnormal politics’. Russia was able to close down its period of ‘abnormal politics’ after the 2011 elections by mid-2012. So we don’t yet know if Ukraine will do the same.
What are the elites’ calculations?
The established leaders of the opposition were caught off guard by what was in origin a social network protest and the protesters are not necessarily trying to put them in power. Inevitably if sadly, the parliamentary opposition decided only one week ago to run three candidates in 2015 (Klitschko, Yatseniuk and Tiahnybok), they have engaged in something of a public popularity contest. Klitschko seems to be winning.
There are similar tensions within the ruling elite. There are signs of defection; but there are also rules of momentum. Elites may be thinking about defecting, but they also thinking about whether other elites are likely to jump ship. It is not clear how many MPs have resigned from the governing party. The President’s Chief of Staff first resigned and then was suddenly back at his desk. The ruling Party of Regions easily defeated a first attempt to unseat the government on 3 December (the motion won only 186 out of 450 votes).
Has Russia miscalculated?
Since the summer, Russia has been piling the pressure on all six states in the Eastern Partnership, as well as targeting Lithuania, the Summit host last week. Armenia dropped out in September, Belarus was only ever a marginal participant; Azerbaijan was rightly or wrongly treated as a special case because it is an energy supplier. Those who attended the Vilnius Summit put on a brave face. They were reluctant to use language like ‘disaster’ or even ‘disappointment’ which would endorse the Russian position. But at the end of the summit, the Russians could not have been more pleased. According to Fyodor Lukyanov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, “In the past few weeks, this turned into a zero-sum game between Russia and the European Union. Tactically, this was a clear Russian win."
Now things look rather different, as (a seeming) geopolitical victory arrived in the company of fearful prospects of ”colour revolutions.“ The Orange revolution left a powerful impression on the Kremlin. Ever since 2004, Putin has put an enormous amount of effort into inoculating Russia from the spread of these type of protests, and covertly helping Ukraine and other neighbouring states to do the same. Now the crowds are back in Ukraine. And they have used the same kind of ‘technologies’ – peaceful protest, social media – that the Kremlin has always feared might be exported by the Arab Spring.
In 2004 there was no prospect of a revolution in Russia, even though the regime panicked. Now, there is. True, Putin survived his own protest wave in 2011-12, when the Moscow protestors talked in vain of organising a ‘Russian Maidan’. They may not currently have the strength to try again, but Putin will be thinking about how to stop them. The Russian blogosphere and twitter-world is full of comments on and comparisons with #Euromaidan – “if they can do it, why can’t we“? Putin of course does not currently have the same vulnerabilities as Yanukovych. The Russian state and economy are more robust. But the outlook for the medium-term suddenly looks less secure. Putin’s actions over the coming months will show us what lessons – for domestic as well as foreign policy - he has extracted from the current events in Kiev.
Can the domino process reverse itself?
At the end of the Vilnius Summit, people were worrying that Russia might increase the pressure on the two remaining ‘success stories‘ - Moldova and Georgia. They will obviously be watching closely what happens in Ukraine; and will take heart if the Ukrainian protests are successful. This could be a time of general democratic renewal or, yet again, disillusion.
What did the EU do wrong?
For the EU, the Vilnius Summit and the related events have offered a healthy, if somewhat bitter lesson. It is important to draw the right conclusions from it. First, for too long the EU seems to have been unaware of the real nature of tensions, calculations and power relationships inside Ukraine, as well as of the essence and meaning of contacts between Russia and Ukraine. The EU expected reality to bend itself to accommodate the EU’s somewhat procedures-based approach. When it didn’t, the EU did not have a plan B. It did not stick to its principles or play power games properly.
The EU over-concentrated on the Tymoshenko case. It was not a mistake to object to her wrongful imprisonment. But the Yanukovych regime was always likely to be reluctant to budge on this particular issue and the EU did not think of analysing the alternative wants and weaknesses of the regime. The Cox-Kwaśniewski mission had too narrow a focus and became too leverageable. The demand to release Tymoshenko should still have been there, but should have been embedded in some broader process. That said, once Tymoshenko’s release had been made the most prominent explicit condition for signing, it was wrong to backtrack the way the EU did, forgetting her entirely in the latest phases of talks.
Arguably, Yanukovych’s reluctance saved the EU from a bad agreement with Ukraine at the Vilnius Summit – if it had agreed to just some of Ukraine’s outrageous list of demands and lost face by signing the agreement without Tymoshenko’s release. Before Vilnius, Prime Minister Azarov claimed that Ukraine needed between “150 and 165 billion Euros” to help with modernisation. As of 3 December, the demand had come down to 10 billion Euros. Clearly, to some degree the EU fell into the trap of being caught in a bidding war, implicitly, but ineptly accepting the Russian zero-sum game and not playing its own soft power advantages. The EU was not prepared for such a contest.
Now the EU should learn to combine normative and realistic approaches in a more effective way. The normative approach needs to be upheld in relations with Ukraine, but it needs to be combined with readiness to onoffer some much-needed economic help a strictly conditional basis (not to be confused with uncritical bank-rolling of the regime, which the EU was right to refrain from.)
The EU should also have a serious brainstorm about its relations with Russia – in the context of the Eastern Partnership, but also more generally. It should be ready to seriously counter Russian pressure that is undoubtedly coming, should Ukraine reconsider and aspire to sign the agreement in the near future. This – given the popular mood in Ukraine and the effects this has on the elites – is not entirely unrealistic. The second chance may come soon, and the EU should be better prepared.
Meanwhile, the EU should busy itself by looking for more creative approaches to engage the best Europeans in Ukraine – the country’s civil society.
How should the EU and the world react in both the short and the medium-term?
The EU should strongly emphasise the illegitimacy of regime violence. It should also stress that the use of paid provocateurs is being monitored. Black PR about protestors initiating violence should not be believed. Any repeat of Saturday’s violence should be met with coordinated protest.
There should be as big a turnout at the OSCE Ministerial Council as possible, including from the EEAS. Issues of physical safety at the meeting should not be exaggerated. Any EU ministers will be warmly welcomed by the crowds. This is the ideal time to caution the regime, and warn that any crackdown will be met with sanctions, just as in Belarus after the 2010 elections. This is a much bigger threat to the Ukrainian elite.
The EU should be prepared to move quickly on any mediation request – especially if it comes from Russia first.
It needs to be emphasised that the Agreements on offer at Vilnius are still on the table. If the composition of the government changes, it will be more willing to return to negotiations. If the government completely changes, we should be prepared to schedule an emergency signing summit, before the next scheduled EU-Ukraine meeting in March 2014. If Ukraine comes back to the table beforehand (and the delegation sent to Brussels refrains from making more demands), it must stick to the conditionality originally applied or betray the demonstrators in Kiev.
Ukraine’s blackmail at Vilnius was unacceptable. The EU cannot and should not reconsider its refusal to bankroll the regime. But the EU can help with opening markets to goods and services subject to Russian trade restrictions. It can help smooth a path to the IMF, but again Ukraine must be pressed to adopt the necessary reforms. Ukraine needs prospects of a European future. The EU’s role should not be to shield the country from the consequences of its own failings, but to start an integration process focused on implementation.
The EU must shift politics away from the elite and the technical approach of the past to an approach based on solidarity with and support for Ukrainian civil society. Ukraine can be fast-tracked to visa freedom once it takes the same steps as Moldova. The EU should advertise the benefits of Erasmus Plus from January 2014.
Before the recent events, the EU was pushing Ukraine to reform its legal system because of issues of ‘selective justice’. This is even more important now that the regime has used force against its own citizens. The depoliticisation of the entire legal, security and judicial system is now an issue and the EU can help strengthen the rule of law in Ukraine through the EU-Ukraine Agreements. The EU should therefore avoid talk of ‘regime change’. It must be up to Ukrainians themselves whether to make any such change. What matters long-term is quality of governance and the rule of law: if the opposition takes over we should make sure they come in with the new rules of the game. EU conditionality can help here. The EU should indicate that it is serious about Ukraine, if Ukraine is serious about the EU.
